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Abstract
Conventional wisdom holds that the terrorist attacks of
September 11 have “changed everything.” In the case of
refugee policy, it would appear the salience of security and
enforcement aspects has increased at the expense of hu-
man rights and humanitarian concerns. In the light of ac-
tual practices in the immigration and refugee security
field in recent years, there is actually more continuity
than discontinuity resulting from the current crisis. Exist-
ing standards and procedures are confirmed, rather than
altered, by new legislation and practices. Refugee policies
have increasingly been understood within a national secu-
rity discourse, well before September 11.
Résumé
La sagesse traditionnelle prétend que les attentats terror-
istes du 11 septembre ont « tout changé ». Pour ce qui est
de la politique ayant trait aux réfugiés, il semblerait que
les considérations de sécurité et d’application de la loi ont
pris le pas sur les droits de la personne et les préoccupa-
tions humanitaires. En fait, si l’on considère la pratique
sur le terrain en ce qu’il s’agit des mesures de sécurité
liées à l’immigration et aux réfugiés, on retrouve bien
plus de continuité que de discontinuité à la suite de la
crise actuelle. La nouvelle législation, ainsi que les nou-
velles procédures, confirment les normes existantes plutôt
que de les changer. Les politiques concernant les réfugiés
sont de plus en plus comprises à l’intérieur d’un discours
de sécurité nationale et cela était le cas bien avant le 11
septembre.
I
n the aftermath of September 11, it was conventional
journalistic wisdom that the world had changed forever.
Certain events do have profound repercussions. Pearl
Harbor brought the U.S. into a global military and diplo-
matic presence from which it has never really retreated.
September 11 has obviously precipitated a “war on terror-
ism,” the attack on and overthrow of the Taliban regime,
and a new global counterterrorist campaign that steps up
U.S. intervention in a host of countries to unprecedented
levels. September 11 has dramatically reconfigured govern-
ment agendas in the U.S. and among its allies, including
Canada. New laws that redraw the lines between individual
and group rights on the one hand and security on the other
have been rapidly passed in a number of Western countries.
There is no point in denying the depth and the scope of
the changes that September 11 has wrought. But there is a
danger of exaggerating the transformation. It further bloats
the already overblown reputations of Osama bin Laden and
al Qaeda to speak as if this handful of suicide bombers
caused by themselves the wholesale transformation of
Western societies and governments. To revert for a mo-
ment to Pearl Harbor, the forces that compelled America
into a new global role were not only external, but arose from
within America itself. Pearl Harbor discredited the isola-
tionists overnight and empowered the interventionists, but
this was made possible by the very real strength and reach
of the interventionist and expansionary forces themselves.
Pearl Harbor precipitated a resolution of a deep conflict
within the U.S. state and society, rapidly accelerating and
compressing a process that was already underway, and had
been for some time.
As a formative event, September 11 displays similar con-
tours. There were forces and processes at work within the
U.S. and the West, some previously impeded, that have
been unblocked and accelerated by September 11. Septem-
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ber 11 precipitated the resolution of a number of conflicts
already in existence. But the long-term changes effected by
September 11 were those that corresponded to interests and
forces that had shown considerable strength before Sep-
tember 11. In that sense we might say that September 11
was more a precipitating than a formative event.
Let me be more specific. The post-Cold War world had
been witnessing a gathering set of contradictions surround-
ing the process of globalization. There are a number of such
contradictions, but I wish to focus on  one particularly
salient set: the contradiction between the licit and illicit, the
legal and the illegal, the above ground  and the under-
ground, the bright and dark sides of globalization. Increas-
ingly, the world of transnational capitalism was being
shadowed by its dark doppelgänger. Transnational corpo-
rations are shadowed by international criminal mafias; na-
tional armies by terrorist cells; global commerce by the
illegal arms, drugs, and sex trade; global finance by money
laundering networks; legal migration of people by organ-
ized illegal human traffic. A globalized world is being un-
dermined by borderless threats. And the forces of the dark
side are not only taking full advantage of the latest technolo-
gies that make the licit global economy possible, but they
mimic the organizational forms and strategies that have
proved so potent in internationalizing enterprise. This is
the old Hobbesian problem of competitive individual ra-
tional maximizing behaviour leading ineluctably to general
insecurity, the war of all against all, now extended to the
global stage. The Hobbesian answer was the transfer of
individual power to Leviathan, the common power. In the
era of globalization and borderless threats, the problem has
to be redefined: How to police not national territory but
what Castells has aptly dubbed the “space of flows”? How
to reconstitute Leviathan, preferably as a multilateral enter-
prise, or perhaps, more ominously, as directed by the U.S.,
the world’s only superpower.
There were many powerful forces already working to-
ward a global solution to the policing problem. Generally,
this could be seen as a hybrid between a multilateral and an
American Leviathan, with awesome surveillance capacities.
But these forces also faced numerous contradictions. Take
money laundering – general agreement that something
should be done and that a U.S.-led global surveillance
regime was the answer began to fall apart when individual
corporate actors realized that Uncle Sam was going to be
peering into their financial transactions and those of their
clients. Progress faltered, stuttered, became bogged down.
Then September 11 unblocked the process when President
Bush noted that the financing of terrorist cells could be
tracked and stopped by pursuing the money laundering
trail, and that it was the firm resolve of his government to
do exactly that. Since the terrorists had destroyed the very
citadel and symbol of global finance,  the World  Trade
Center, transnational capital quickly lost its scruples about
maintaining the sanctity of its clients’ financial informa-
tion. September 11 simply accelerated a process already well
in place but not fully up to speed.
How does this translate into the treatment of refugees in
Canada? September 11, it is said, has caused a reversal of
Canada’s priorities. A human rights and humanitarian dis-
course surrounding refugee movements has quickly been
superseded by a national security discourse, with dire con-
sequences for genuine refugees. Harmonization of immi-
gration security policies and practices with the U.S., as part
of a perimeter security agenda to avert economically costly
border controls, would, some have argued, undermine Ca-
nadian sovereignty, and make us less liberal, less tolerant,
more like the security-conscious Americans.
I would argueon thecontrary thatweare not seeing areversal
but an acceleration of trends already evident well before Sep-
tember 11. Refugee policies post-September 11 are pretty
much like refugee policies pre-September 11, but more so.
Let me quote from Audrey Macklin’s fine assessment of
C-36, the Anti-Terrorism Act: She argues that C-11, The
Immigration and Refugee Protection Act , which preceded
September 11, already “casts a wide net over non-citizens
rendered inadmissible on security grounds, expands the
detention power over designated security risks, and reduces
access to independent review of Ministerial security deci-
sions.” She goes on to note that “the immigration law has
long done to non-citizens what The Anti-Terrorism Act
proposes to do to citizens – without public outcry and with
judicial blessing.”1
Take some of the contentious aspects of C-36. As I
testified myself before the Justice Committee of the House
of Commons on C-36, the evidence provisions of the Act,
which drew criticism for severely restricting the rights of the
individual and expanding unreasonably the rights of the
state, are actually nothing new, and have been operating in
immigration security cases for some time, plunging the
defendants into Kafkaesque situations in which the
Crown’s precise case and its supporting evidence can be
speculated about but never known for certain. I have myself
seen this happen time and again when appearing as an
expert witness in a series of high-profile immigration secu-
rity cases. C-36 was simply trying to Stinchcombe-proof the
practice of non-disclosure of evidence that might damage
national security, following that Supreme Court decision.2
It was not clear that they even needed to do this, since
Stinchcombe dealt with criminal intelligence rather than
security intelligence information, but the attitude was ob-
viously: better safe than sorry.
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On the matter of non-disclosure of security evidence,
Canada actually has a record of greater restrictiveness than
the U.S. Indeed, one of the contributing factors in the U.S.
to the unfortunate decision to institute offshore military
tribunals to try al Qaeda suspects was the apparent inability
of the court system to guarantee that sensitive intelligence
information might not be disclosed. In Canada, military
tribunals  would be  unnecessary, not because Canada is
more liberal than the U.S., but because it is more restrictive
in the protection of national security information in court.
Or take the matter of the indefinite detention of refugee
claimants and other non-citizens about whom security
doubts need to be resolved. The U.S. has been moving
toward a wider net of detentions on suspicion alone. If U.S.
pressures force Canada into following suit,  it has been
argued that Canada would have to reverse the Singh deci-
sion,3 and that this would radically alter Canadian practices
and the liberal philosophy that lies behind them. But deten-
tion of refugees under threat of deportation on security
grounds is a practice widely used already; see Suresh,4 and
earlier Baroud5 (both cases in which I have been involved),
in which the defendants were detained for lengthy periods
awaiting court decisions. There are many other examples.
To be sure, Canada, to its credit, continues to insist that
detention must be for cause, and has resisted American and
British trends toward detention on suspicion alone. But the
non-disclosure of much of the evidence on which security
certificates are based make this a somewhat hollow example
of liberalism.
Refugee policies in Canada have long been formulated
within a discourse that gives a privileged place, an overrid-
ing priority, to national security. Humanitarian considera-
tions have never been absent, but neither have they ever
been dominant, in the past or the present. Post-war refugee
resettlement policies were firmly set, both internationally
and nationally, within the political context of the Cold War.
The very definition of a legitimate refugee claimant was
coloured by Cold War ideology, and Canadian policy, rela-
tively admirable from a humanitarian perspective in com-
parative context, was always subject to an ideological
double standard as between refugees from Communist
regimes and those fleeing right-wing, anti-Communist re-
gimes. In the post-Cold War world, this four-decade old
frame of reference has more or less disintegrated, but in its
place there are new definitions of risk, and some old re-
sponses. The Cold War pooling of intelligence on immigra-
tion has been updated and made more sophisticated in the
current era, but the targets are more varied, depending on
which regions of the world are generating violent refugee-
producing conflicts. Domestic and international security
considerations continue to play a leading role in the formu-
lation of rules for granting asylum. This continues to be
contested terrain, with conservative critics charging that
security rules are too lax, while refugee advocates and lib-
eral critics assert that security considerations are impeding
the fulfillment of humanitarian obligations.6
In this context, the effect of September 11 has been to
strengthen the conservative critics, while weakening the
liberal case. It must be said that this is not entirely without
justification. September 11 was above all an attack on civil
society, indeed was designed by its perpetrators as a mes-
sage to spread terror and insecurity throughout civil soci-
ety. With the carnage at the World Trade Center, the
terrorists have clearly demonstrated that they operate un-
der no constraints about the mass murder of civilians. The
technical potential exits for the use of chemical, biological,
or nuclear weapons of mass destruction. Thus there has
been a very strong populist reaction to the evidence of the
abuse of the refugee system by terrorists intent upon turn-
ing the West’s liberal institutions against it in particularly
horrendous ways. That these have been very few in number
set against the far larger numbers of genuine and deserving
refugees is an argument with relatively little purchase on the
popular imagination, even though it is an argument that
must be reiterated in the interest of fairness.
It is not efficacious under present circumstances to dis-
regard or decry as unfounded the contemporary imperative
to tighten up requirements for refugee acceptance. To do
so is not only to fly in the face of public opinion, but to fly
in the face of a rational public policy response to a grave
security threat. Some asylum seekers have abused the good
faith and generosity that Canada has shown, in ways that
go far beyond the manipulation of the system by economic
migrants or other bogus claimants who have been con-
demned so often in the past by conservative critics. Given
the potentially catastrophic consequences, the risk of even
a few terrorists slipping into North America via the refugee
route must be assessed as high by those whose responsibili-
ties are primarily the protection of homeland security.
This does not mean that humanitarian standards should
be, or need be, thrown out the window. It does mean that
the terms of the debate have shifted significantly. Liberal
arguments that fail to take reasonable account of security
requirements will not get far, but liberal arguments that
seek to balance security requirements with humanitarian
objectives will still be heard. Yet this situation is really not
qualitatively different than it has been at any time in the
post-war era. Perhaps anxieties are more pronounced than
in the immediate past, but there was an earlier panic, during
the initial stages of the Cold War in the late 1940s and early
1950s, and this resulted in permanent institutional and
legal residues that continue to shape policy down to today.
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In short, the shift in the terms of debate today is nothing
new. A cyclical process responding to perceived external
threats to domestic security is still at work, and can be
expected to yield some security ground to liberal and hu-
manitarian values once again when the immediate impact
of the crisis recedes.
Some liberal critics see the effect of September 11 as
force-feeding Canada an American-style security con-
sciousness that is alien to a country with more tolerant,
progressive traditions. While Canada, peripheral to the
imperial centre that is, and long has been, the primary target
of hostile forces, has slightly more space to develop modest
liberal,  humanitarian practices, the difference  is  one of
degree, and the margin has always been small. Moreover,
pressures to intensify American-style security standards
come not only from the United States, but, very impor-
tantly, from forces inside Canada, some bureaucratic, but
many emanating from sections of civil society that find
insistent expression in Parliament from the right-wing par-
ties, from provincial premiers, and from the conservative
media. These forces, more favourable to national security
than to humanitarian considerations, are every bit as en-
during an aspect of the Canadian political culture as those
more favourable to the “human security” agenda of recent
years.
Canadian refugee advocates sometimes counterpose to
the American model an imagined Canadian community –
liberal, tolerant, progressive – that is, to some considerable
degree, an imaginary Canada. Would a harmonized immi-
gration security system with the U.S., as envisaged in the
schemes for “perimeter security” of North America, compel
rending changes in the Canadian way? It is hard to see how.
We have for some time operated on much the same as-
sumptions about who are admissible and who not. We have
common databases on who are the bad guys, and which the
bad countries and organizations. Our basic motivations are
the same – to retain legitimate humanitarian considera-
tions, while not permitting these to seriously undermine
the protection of national security from terrorism and
crime. Besides, there is much that is distinctive in Canadian
immigration policy that will remain untouched by the har-
monization of security rules and practices. One example:
the long-standing desire of Quebec to use its constitutional
role in immigration to actively support francophone immi-
gration is a distinctive feature of Canadian policy. The U.S.
has no security or other interests that would in any way
challenge this distinctive priority.
If there has been a gap between the Canadian and U.S.
records in immigration security, it is not one of rules and
standards, but simply of enforcement, due to the allocation
of fewer resources in the past to this area in Canada. That
was already changing before September 11, pushed by the
case of Ahmed Ressam, the al Qaeda terrorist from Algeria,
apprehended attempting to enter the U.S. in late 1999 with
explosives on his way to an operation to bomb the Los
Angeles airport. C-11, the new Immigration Act, had al-
ready posed tougher admission requirements. Critics had
argued that the problem with C-11 security provisions was
with inadequate enforcement resources, not content. When
the enforcement gap closes, as it will, with further infusions
of cash into policing and security, there will be even less
difference between the two countries, at least in this one
area of immigration security. In any event, exploratory talks
on perimeter security among Canadian and American offi-
cials had begun even before Ressam, let alone September
11, and the impetus came as much from the Canadian as
from the American side.
Having made these points, are we implying that Canada,
in its post-September 11 refugee policies, is abandoning, or
severely curtailing, its humanitarian commitments to
genuine refugees? Not necessarily. The refugee security
discourse has itself been premised upon humanitarian con-
siderations. Cold War refugee policies derived in part from
genuine concerns about the humanitarian costs of Com-
munist totalitarianism. True, less attention was paid to the
humanitarian costs of right-wing anti-Communist dicta-
torships, but such instances of hypocrisy should not be
allowed to obscure the original humanitarian roots of the
post-war policy of opening the door to those fleeing repres-
sive regimes. In this regard, we should take seriously Irwin
Cotler’s  argument that  post-September 11 anti-terrorist
laws and actions can be seen as part of a human security, or
human rights, agenda.7 This involves a number of compel-
ling points. First, civil society must be protected against acts
of mass murder. Second, immigrant groups and individuals
in Canada must be protected against the kind of violence
and intimidation practised by terrorist groups organizing
support (or what sometime amounts to little more than
protection money) among their expatriate communities.
Finally, on a global scale, the climate of insecurity resulting
from the violence of lawless and borderless non-state actors
has to be reduced if other parts of the global human agenda
are to be achieved.
Of course, there is always a price to be paid when security
outweighs liberalism, even if momentarily. In the post-Sep-
tember 11 world, there is a  serious humanitarian (and
multicultural) price tag attached to the inevitable appear-
ance of ethnic profiling as a tool in the policing of terrorism.
Young Arab and Muslim men – especially those coming
from countries like Egypt, Algeria, Saudi Arabia, and
Yemen, where al Qaeda recruiting has been most effective,
will certainly get more attention than other, low-risk
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groups. In part this is an inescapable result of cost-effective
policing. What looks to those on the receiving end as racism
or cultural  victimization appears  to police  and security
forces simply as sensible risk management.
There are some mitigating  circumstances. There is a
point of contrast between September 11 and past experi-
ence that reflects favourably on the behaviour of govern-
ments today. In the immediate aftermath of the attacks, the
American President and his Attorney General were at pains
to indicate that the Arab and Muslim communities in the
U.S. were in no way to blame, and that any retaliatory
violence directed against these minorities would be met
with the full force of the law. These statements were not
given as asides, but were delivered as important front and
centre assertions of government policy. They were echoed
forcefully in Canada by Prime Minister Jean Chrétien. C-
36, despite its condemnation by Arab and Muslim groups
who testified against it before the Justice Committee of the
House of Commons, does not direct anti-terrorist attention
toward any identifiable ethnic or religious group. It does
include strengthened hate provisions directed against those
who would attack mosques or other minority cultural in-
stitutions. It is safe to conclude that North American gov-
ernments have learned some things from the mistakes of
history. The shameful treatment of the Japanese communi-
ties in the Second World War will not be repeated for Arab
and Muslim communities in the aftermath of September 11.
Mitigating circumstances will not, however, be much
appreciated by those on the receiving end of risk-aversive
policing that in practical terms does amount to ethnic
profiling. Both Canada’s humanitarian  obligations with
regard to refugees and the integrity  of its multicultural
social fabric will be under some stress from the differential
impact of September 11 on people from Middle Eastern
countries.
So far the “war on terrorism” has been relatively success-
ful. If no further attacks on North America are forthcom-
ing, the repressive implications of September 11 will tend
to recede, and long-term damage to pluralist tolerance
should be minimal. If, on the other hand, more attacks like
September 11, or worse, do occur, we can be assured that
national security will rapidly overwhelm liberal humanitar-
ian considerations, in refugee policy as elsewhere. That is a
future we all wish devoutly to avoid. But to prevent such a
dismal scenario, some compromises between security and
freedom have to made in the present.
Notes
1. Audrey Macklin, “Borderline Security.” In The Security of
Freedom: Essays on Canada’s Anti-Terrorism Bill, ed. Ronald J.
Daniels, Patrick Macklem, and Kent Roach (Toronto: Univer-
sity of Toronto Press, 2001) 384, 394.
2. R. v. Stinchcombe [1991] 3 S.C.R. 326.
3. Singh v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration)
[1985] 1 S.C.R. 549.
4. Suresh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration)
[2002] SCC 1.
5. Baroud (Re), (1995) F.C.J. No. 829, May 1995.
6. Reg Whitaker, “Refugees: The Security Dimension,” Citizen-
ship Studies 2:3 (November 1998) 413–34.
7. Irwin Cotler, “Thinking Outside the Box: Fundamental Prin-
ciples for a Counter-Terrorism Law and Policy.” In The Secu-
rity of Freedom, op. cit., 11–30.
Reg Whitaker is Distinguished Research Professor Emeritus at
York University and Adjunct Professor of Political Science,
University of Victoria. This paper was first presented at a
conference entitled “Peacekeeping or Gatekeeping: Canadian
Security Policy after September 11,” hosted by the York Centre
for Security Studies at York University on February 7 and 8,
2002.
Refugee Policy after September 11

